Wednesday, September 12, 2012

Morality a la Ben



First of all, this is an incredibly challenging question that countless people have devoted their entire lives to and I can’t really even pretend to satisfactorily answer it here. That said, I’ll outline some of my thoughts on the issue.

I generally reject the concept of an objective morality as on face flawed: nothing is inviolable and attempts to prove the contrary are inherently circular.

As far as how a society should function, my views could be generally described as rule utilitarian with deontological side constraints as flavored by Rawls. This means…

Rawls: society should be designed such that everyone could accept it without knowing what their position in society would be (Veil of Ignorance/Original Position). He also argued maximin, that actions should be undertaken to maximize the welfare of the worst off in society, and I’m not sure I buy this.

Deontological side constraints: certain rights shouldn’t be violated. For example, the government shouldn’t torture terrorists even if it could save a couple lives by doing so (which doesn’t actually work, so no problem there).

Rule util: We should use rules that maximize utility. It’s like utilitarianism but distinguished from act in that there are moral guidelines based on what generally maximizes utility.

That’s a rough sketch of where I stand on morality. As far as the human nature, I’m generally inclined to believe that people can’t inherently be classified as good or evil. I believe that the environment in which one is raised is the primary determinant and that to eliminate “evil” we must improve the lives of children.

On the concept of evilness, I am fascinated and slightly repulsed by Nietzsche’s critique. Nietzsche believes that moralizing—calling an act evil—is, paradoxically, the root cause of evil. For instance, when the Rwandan genocide occurred, it was because Hutus and Tutsis viewed the other as evil. What does this mean? Can you not view anything as evil? I reject nihilism and instead reach the conclusion that you should question inherently any essentialization.

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